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Abstract
I defend and develop a traditional view in the metaphysics of sound, The
Wave Theory of Sound. According The Wave Theory, as developed herein,
sounds are not patterned disturbances so much as their propagation. And the
propagation of a patterned disturbance is not a form of travel, but a dynamic
in-formation, the wave-form successively inhering in differently located parts
of the dense and elastic medium. This conception, along with the assumption
that we hear not only sounds but their sources, has the resources to address
many of the most recent criticisms of this traditional view.
1 Motion in a Medium
In this essay I shall defend and develop The Wave Theory of Sound. According
to The Wave Theory, sound is a kind of motion in a medium, speciﬁcally, an event
of rarefaction. What this means exactly requires some unpacking. Providing a
credible and coherent interpretation of The Wave Theory is the central aim of
the present essay.
The Wave Theory has come on hard times of late—unfairly, to my mind. Many
are of the opinion that it is no longer a viable alternative in the metaphysics of
sound, and this despite a long and venerable history (for some of that history see
Pasnau 2000). As we shall see, many apparent difficulties facing The Wave The-
ory are due to an exclusive focus on hearing sounds. An exclusive focus on hearing
sounds can lead to a distorted conception not only of audition but of the sounds
themselves. With respect to audition it can encourage, for example, the thought
that the function of audition is to afford the perceiver with auditory awareness
of sounds. But if we can hear not only sounds, but their sources as well, under-
stood as sound-generating events, it is more likely that the function of audition
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is to afford the perceiver awareness of the distal sources of sound (Nudds 2009,
Leddington 2014, Kalderon 2018, chapter 4). With respect to sound, an exclusive
focus on hearing sounds can lead to conﬂating features of sources with features of
the sounds that they generate. Many of the recent criticisms of The Wave Theory
turn on just such a conﬂation, as do many of the arguments in favor of so-called
distal conceptions of sound.
The aim of this essay is not to establish The Wave Theory of Sound from ﬁrst
principles. Nor even that it is better, on balance, than its alternatives. Rather,
in defending and developing The Wave Theory of Sound, I aim only to establish
that The Wave Theory is a coherent, credible alternative in the metaphysics of
sound. In aiming only to establish the intelligibility of The Wave Theory of Sound,
many of the critical remarks about its alternatives are not meant to persuade their
adherents so much as to show how these alternaties might intelligibly be resisted
within a given framework.
2 Assumptions
In defending and developing The Wave Theory of Sound, I shall make a number
of assumptions. The conclusions of the present essay should be understood to be
conditional upon them:
(1) Sounds are particulars.
(2) Sounds are the bearers or substrata of audible qualities.
(3) (With Berkeley) if sources are audible, then sources have audible qualities.
(4) Sounds are not the sole bearers or substrata of audible qualities; in propitious cir-
cumstances, we can hear, as well, their sources (understood as sound-generating
events).
(5) The bearers of audible qualities are events, and hence audible qualities are es-
sentially sustained by activity.
Though I cannot here make a full dress defence, allow me to both explain and
motivate these insofar as I can.
(1) Sounds are particulars. Though I do not assume it here, I am tempted by the
more general claim that all sensibles are particulars. (Very roughly, if perception is
best conceived as an encounter with the sensible, and one can only encounter par-
ticulars, then the sensibles that we encounter in perceptual experience must them-
selves be particulars.) That sounds are particulars is a substantive claim, though in
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some ways a liberal one. Particulars, after all, belong to a range of ontological cat-
egories. Thus bodies, events, processes, and quality instances are all particulars,
but they have different modes of being and thus belong to different ontological
categories. But if particulars belong to a range of ontological categories then the
claim that sounds are particulars does not yet determine which ontological cate-
gory sounds belong to. Thus while a substantive claim, it is liberal in the sense of
being consistent with substantively different metaphysics of sounds.
For example, that at least heard sounds are particulars is consistent even with a
broadly Lockean metaphysics of sound where sounds are qualities, if not necessar-
ily secondary qualities (besides Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 2 8,
see Pasnau 1999, Kulvicki 2008, Cohen 2010, and Roberts 2017). Hearing is objec-
tive. If there is nothing actual heard, then nothing is actually heard. So if sounds
are qualities, then at least in the case of heard sound, the sound that you hear must
be a quality instance and not an uninstantiated universal. Only instances of univer-
sals and not uninstantiated universals are actual in the relevant sense. And if the
quality is conceived as a power or disposition, then it must be their manifestation.
Only manifestations of powers or dispositions are actual in the relevant sense (in
Peripatetic vocabulary, a second actuality, De Anima 2 5). So at least with respect
to heard sound, our ﬁrst assumption is consistent even with a broadly Lockean
metaphysics of sound.
(2) Sounds are the bearers or substrata of audible qualities. Our ﬁrst assumption may
be consistent with a broadly Lockean metaphysics of sound, at least in the case
of heard sound, but not so our second assumption, for according to it, when com-
bined with the ﬁrst, sounds are not qualities, but the particulars that are the bear-
ers or substrata of audible qualities. Aristotle, in De Anima 2 11 422 b 31–2, endorses
this view on phenomenological grounds. It is at least the case that we are inclined
to describe our experience of sounds in this way. Thus we say that we can hear a
sound getting louder, or its pitch varying over time. Auditory experience seems
to present sounds with a dynamic proﬁle of auditory qualities. The audible quali-
ties of a sound thus vary over time, and the sound persists through this variation.
Indeed, the kind of sound that it is can depend upon the pattern of variation in
audible qualities that it displays. (For discussion of these points, see O’Callaghan
2010.) Given our assumptions, sounds may be particulars that are the bearers or
substrata of audible qualities, and so not audible qualities themselves, but so far at
least it remains indeterminate which ontological category these particulars belong
to. The ontological category of these particulars will be addressed by our ﬁfth
assumption.
(3) (With Berkeley) if sources are audible, then sources have audible qualities. According
to Berkeley, we hear only sounds. The sources of sounds are, strictly speaking, in-
audible. In Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley distinguishes sounds
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from their sources by an application of Leibniz’s Law. Sounds have audible qual-
ities that sources lack. Sources, lacking audible qualities, are thereby inaudible.
So Berkeley is assuming that if sources are audible, then they have audible qual-
ities. He denies that they have audible qualities and concludes, by modus tollens,
that sources are inaudible. Equally, however, on may grant Berkeley the condi-
tional and reason instead my modus ponens. Doing so would be to assume, as our
next assumption does, that sources are audible and conclude that they have audi-
ble qualities. What audible qualities could they have? Insofar as it is associated
with the material structure of bodies relevant to their participating in the sound-
generating event, timbre is a good candidate. Or if timbre is not a well deﬁned
category, if it is understood, in a deﬂationary fashion, as whatever varies as pitch
and volume are held constant, then some relatively natural subcomponent of tim-
bre is a good candidate for being an audible quality of the source understood as a
sound-generating event (though see Kulvicki 2008 for an argument that timbre is
a quality of bodies and not their activity).
(4) Sounds are not the sole bearers or substrata of audible qualities; in propitious circum-
stances, we can hear, as well, their sources (understood as sound-generating events). I shall
assume that we not only hear sounds but, at least in propitious circumstances,
their sources as well. We ordinarily speak of bodies and their sound-generating
activities indifferently as sources. Bodies are said to be sources insofar as they
have the power to sound, to engage in sound-generating activity. However, by
source, I shall mean, not a body possessing the power to sound so much as the
sound-generating activity it gives rise to. For present purposes I restrict talk of
sources to sound-generating events since plausibly only these, and not bodies, ﬁg-
ure in auditory experience (for a defence of this and a partial accommodation of
the opposing view see Kalderon 2018, chapter 3.4). Sources, so understood, are
sound-generating events. If we hear, not only sounds, but sometimes their sources
as well, then sounds are not alone in being the bearers or substrata of audible qual-
ities. If we sometimes hear the sources of sound—not just the sound of the door
slamming but the door slamming—then the sources of sound are audible. And if
they are audible, then they must possess audible qualities. Again, a natural sub-
component of timbre, since it carries information about the material structure
of bodies relevant to their participation in the sound-generating event, is a good
candidate for an audible quality of a sound source.
That we can hear not only sounds but their sources as well is an important thesis
in the philosophy of audition since it bears not only on the objects of auditory
experience but on its nature as well. Not only does it bear on the proper function of
auditory experience but potentially on its structure as well. Someone who thinks
that we hear sources by hearing the sounds that they generate will conceive of
the structure of auditory experience differently from someone who denies this (a
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topic explored in section 7). It is also an important thesis in the metaphysics of
sound. If we can hear not only sounds but their sources, then having identiﬁed that
an element of auditory experience has some feature, one may not automatically
conclude that it is a feature of a sound—after all, it may be a feature of its heard
source. So an exclusive focus on hearing sound, can lead to a distorted conception
not only of audition but of the sounds themselves.
(5) The bearers of audible qualities are events, and hence audible qualities are essentially sus-
tained by activity. Sources, in our restricted sense, are events. They are, after all,
sound-generating events. But what ontological category do sounds belong to? Are
they too events? Reﬂection upon the conditions under which audible qualities are
instantiated suggests that they are. Insofar as sounds and their sources are the
bearers or substrata of audible qualities, sounds, like their sources, must be essen-
tially dynamic entities like events. Audible qualities are only ever instantiated by
things with duration. We can imagine hearing briefer and briefer pitches but we
cannot conceive of instantaneous pitch, pitch without duration. Sounds, insofar as
they are audible, essentially have duration then. (Prichard’s 1950b inaugural aporia
concerning the inaudibility of sound turns on this point.) Not only do they have a
beginning and end, like mortal animals and other bodies, but they have a distinc-
tive way of being in time. A sound is not wholly present at each moment of its
sounding. Rather, a sound unfolds through the temporal interval of its sounding.
The sound’s audible qualities vary and extinguish as its activity varies and extin-
guishes, and what makes it the sound that it is is just this duration and pattern of
dynamic variation. Sounds thus have the same temporal mode of being as events
(at least as a three-dimensionalist conceives of them, see Fine 2006, for criticism
see Sider 1997 and Hawthorne 2008).
If both sounds and their sources are events, and these are the only bearers or sub-
strata of audible qualities, then the bearers or substrata of audible qualities belong to
a uniform ontological category, they are essentially dynamic entities. Conversely,
this reveals something about the nature of audible qualities. Audible qualities are
qualities essentially sustained by activity. The audible qualities of a sound will
vary and extinguish as the sound’s activity varies and extinguishes. Some states
and qualities are essentially sustained by activity. Thus Ryle (1949) gives the ex-
ample of keeping the enemy at bay. The enemy being kept at bay is a state of the
larger battle, a stable phase of it, but one that requires military activity to sustain.
And Kripke (1972/1980) gives the example of heat and its connection with molecu-
lar motion. Heat is a thermal quality, and a sensible one, but it is a sensible quality
that requires molecular activity to sustain. The only bearers of audible qualities
present in auditory experience are essentially dynamic entities. While a thesis
about the kind of particulars that can be present in auditory experience, when
coupled with our assumption that these particulars are the bearers or substrata of
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audible qualities, it has an important consequence for the nature of audible quali-
ties. If audible qualities only ever inhere in essentially dynamic entities, then they
are qualities essentially sustained by activity.
3 Sonic Events
If sounds are events, then what events are they? Consider the following three
candidates:
(1) Sounds are events that would cause a patterned disturbance to propagate, in
every direction, along rectilinear paths, through a dense and elastic medium,
should there be one. (Casati and Dokic, 1994)
(2) Sounds are the causing of a patterned disturbance to propagate, in every direc-
tion, along rectilinear paths, through a dense and elastic medium. (O’Callaghan,
2007)
(3) Sounds are events of rarefaction. Speciﬁcally, they are the propagation, in every
direction, along rectilinear paths, of a patterned disturbance, through a dense
and elastic medium. (The Wave Theory, O’Shaughnessy 2009, Sorensen 2009,
Kalderon 2018, chapters 3–4)
Our three candidate events have a number of elements in common. It is unsur-
prising that they do given that they are related, if distinct, events. With respect
to the ﬁrst two candidate events, the common elements are features of their char-
acteristic effect. With respect to the third candidate, the common elements are,
by contrast, features of the event itself. What then are their common elements?
The patterned disturbance consists in longitudinal compression waves that vary in
amplitude and frequency. These occur in a dense and elastic medium, be it air, or
water, or some other suitable material. The patterned disturbance is propagating
through the dense and elastic medium. (The nature of the pattern disturbance’s
propagation—whether it is locomotion or some other species of change—will be
addressed in the subsequent section.) Moreover, the propagation of the patterned
disturbance has a certain dynamic structure. The patterned disturbance is propa-
gating, in every direction, along rectilinear paths, from its source. The force with
which the patterned disturbance propagates diffuses through the dense and elastic
medium.
Roger Bacon observes that this is characteristic of events of rarefaction:
Sound is generated when the parts of an object that had been struck
from their natural position, and in this place there comes to be a vibra-
tion of parts [of the surrounding air] in all directions, accompanied by
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a certain rarefaction, since the motion of rarefaction is [along a line]
from the centre to the circumference. (Roger Bacon, Perspectiva 1 8 2
82-85; Lindberg 1996)
Inﬂuenced by al-Kindī and Robert Grosseteste, Bacon’s doctrine was modeled on
the propagation of light:
For light of its very nature diffuses itself in every direction in such a
way that a point of light will produce instantaneously a sphere of light
of any size whatsoever, unless some opaque object stands in the way.
(Robert Grosseteste, De Luce; Riedl 1942, 10)
The ﬁrst candidate event, one that would cause a patterned disturbance to prop-
agate, in every direction, along rectilinear paths, through a dense and elastic medium
should there be one, is existentially independent of the medium. It is also het-
erogenous. It is the bowing, grinding, scraping, vibrating, or whatever kind of
event that would cause a patterned disturbance to propagate, in every direction,
along rectilinear paths, through a dense and elastic medium, should there be one.
But these events could occur even in the absence of such a medium.
The second candidate event, the causing of the patterned disturbance to propa-
gate, in every direction, along rectilinear paths, through a dense and elastic medium,
is not existentially independent of the medium nor is it heterogenous. The event of
causing a patterned disturbance to propagate through a medium could only occur
if there were such a medium. The second candidate event existentially depends
upon the medium. This difference between the ﬁrst two candidates emerges in
the interpretation they give to the tag line of the 1979 movie Aliens: “In space no
one can hear you scream.” On the ﬁrst candidate, sounds are existentially inde-
pendent of the medium, and so the problem is the perceptual inaccessibility of
your screams since there is no suitable medium in space to convey them to an au-
dience. The second and third candidates both endorse conceptions of sound that
are existentially dependent upon medium, and so the problem is the absence of
your screams in space, and this despite your best efforts to produce them. (For
discussion see Pasnau 1999, O’Callaghan 2007, 2009) The second candidate dif-
fers from the ﬁrst, not only in its existential dependence upon a medium, but also
in being non-heterogenous. The causing of a patterned disturbance to propagate
through a medium has a more uniﬁed structure then the bowing, grinding, scrap-
ing, vibrating, and so on (though these would be causings should they occur in such
medium).
The third candidate event, like the second, existentially depends upon the medi-
um. According to The Wave Theory, at least as developed herein, sounds are not
patterned disturbances so much as they are the propagation, in every direction,
along rectilinear paths, of a patterned disturbance, through a dense and elastic
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medium. Such events could only occur if a suitable medium exists. Like the second
candidate, the third candidate event existentially depends upon the medium. Also
like the second candidate, the third candidate has a uniﬁed structure and so is
non-heterogenous. The uniﬁed structure of the third candidate is less abstract
and more dynamic than the uniﬁed structure of the second candidate. As Bacon
observed, it has the characteristic structure of an event of rarefaction. The force
with which the patterned disturbance propagates diffuses through the dense and
elastic medium. And diffusion occurs along rectilinear paths from the center to the
expanding circumference of a sphere. Assuming the medium is perfectly elastic,
and ignoring density, and potential obstructors of sound, we can envision the event
of rarefaction as an ever expanding sphere, the patterned disturbance occurring at
its outer boundary.
Neither the ﬁrst nor the second candidate events display the dynamic structure
of an event of rarefaction. The ﬁrst candidate event could occur or not emdedded
in a suitable medium. Events of rarefaction, however, do not merely occur in a
medium, they are what happens to the medium. Moreover, the dynamic structure
of what happens to the medium is not reﬂected in the bowing, grinding, scraping,
vibrating, or whatever kind of event that disturbs the medium. There is no sense in
which the grinding, for example, is propagating, in every direction, along rectilin-
ear paths. The second candidate may be more uniﬁed than the ﬁrst in identifying
sounds with the causing of patterned disturbances to propagate, in every direc-
tion, along rectilinear paths, through a dense and elastic medium, but the dynamic
structure is what the causing effects, and is not a feature of the causing itself. The
causing does not itself, for example, propagate, in every direction, along rectilinear
paths. That is a feature of the effect, not the cause.
From the perspective of The Wave Theory of Sound, the ﬁrst candidate event is
not a sound, but a potential source of sound. Bowing, grinding, scraping, vibrating,
and so on, are the kind of events that would generate a sound should they occur
in a dense and elastic medium. They are potential sound-generating events where
this potential is realized only when they occur in a suitable medium. If The Wave
Theory is true, if sounds are events of rarefaction, then identifying sounds with
events that would cause a patterned disturbance to propagate, in every direction,
along rectilinear paths, through a dense and elastic medium, should there be one
simply conﬂates sounds with their sources. The second candidate event, unlike the
ﬁrst, does not simply misidentify sound with the source that generates it. However,
as we shall see, it misattributes features of the source to the sound that it generates.
From the perspective of The Wave Theory of Sound, this is a general tendency
among distal conceptions of sound, conceptions according to which sounds have
determinate locations remote from the perceiver.
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4 Two Models of Sonic Propagation
Plato and Aristotle identify sound with motion in a medium (Timaeus 67a–c, 80a–b;
De Anima 2 8). Though they identify sound with motion in a medium we are still a
long way from The Wave Theory as defended herein (see, for example, Cornford’s
1935, 320 n.1 criticism of Archer-Hind 1888). For one thing, both Plato and Aris-
totle conceive of the medium being moved as a continuous unity (on this point, in
the Timaeus account of sound, see Beare 1906, 109). Moreover, the view may be dif-
ferently developed depending upon what, exactly, motion—kìnêsis—means. kìnêsis
is Aristotle’s general term for change of any kind, and so not merely locomotion.
And though it is not a technical term in Plato’s writing the way that it is Aristo-
tle’s, a similar usage can be found especially in the Timaeus. This is important since
kìnêsis here could be locomotion, a change of place over time, or it could instead
be a species of alteration. These contrasting interpretative hypotheses provide us
with two models of sonic propagation.
On the ﬁrst model, sonic propagation is understood in terms of locomotion. So
understood, the patterned disturbance is literally travelling through the dense and
elastic medium. Locomotion is a change paradigmatically undergone by bodies.
In the case of Plato and Aristotle, the relevant bodies would be continuous bodies
of air produced by a sharp percussive blow. However, since we are assuming that
sounds are events and not bodies, does that mean that the model is inapplicable
from the start? The issue is unobvious since events have locations, though perhaps
not in the way that bodies do (see, for example, Davidson 1969). And, sometimes
at least, events change their locations over time. Thus the ﬁght started in the bar
and spilled out into the street. Still, if it is speciﬁcally the patterned disturbance
that is in “motion”, and not the dense and elastic medium that instantiates the
patterned disturbance, then the propagation of the patterned disturbance is better
understood as a species of alteration.
For this reason, Prichard denies that waves and sounds, being what they are, are
subject to locomotion. Only bodies move, and waves and sounds are not bodies:
But … I also made the same remark (viz. that only a body could
move) to a mathematician here. What was in my mind was that it is
mere inaccuracy to say that a wave could move, and that where people
talk of a wave as moving, say with the velocity of a foot, or a mile, or
150,000 miles, a second, the real movement consisted of the oscilla-
tions of certain particles, each of which took place a little later than a
neighbouring oscillation.
He scoffed for quite a different reason. He said that you could il-
lustrate a movement by a noise—that, for example, if an explosion oc-
curred in the middle of Oxford the noise would spread outwards, being
9
heard at different times by people at varying distances from the centre,
so that at one moment the noise was at one place and that a little later
it was somewhere else, and in the interval it had moved from one place
to the other.
Now, of course, it was not in dispute that in the process imagined
people in different places each heard a noise at a rather different time.
The only question was, ‘Was the succession of noises a movement?’, and
I think that on considering the matter you will have to allow that it was
not, and that what happened was that he, being certain of the noises,
and wanting to limit the term ‘movement’ to something he was certain
of, used the term ‘movement’ to designate the succession of noises,
implying that this was the real thing of which we were both talking.
But if this is what happened, then he was using the term ‘movement’
in a sense of his own, and in saying that in the imagined case he was
certain of a movement, he was being certain of something other than
the opposite of what I was certain of. (Prichard, 1950a, 99)
Burnyeat (1995, 430 n. 29, appendix,) lampoons Aristotle for making similar claims
by citing Prichard echoing them here. I have argued, that at least in this instance,
Burnyeat is hoisted by his own petard, (Kalderon, 2015, chapter 3.2). If Prichard is
right, then sonic propagation cannot be understood in terms of locomotion.
On the second model, sonic propagation is understood, not in terms of loco-
motion, but in terms of alteration. So understood, sonic propagation is a kind of
dynamic in-formation. Speciﬁcally, the patterned disturbance is successively in-
forming differently located parts of the dense and elastic medium along a rectilin-
ear paths in every direction away from the source of the sound. Thus the source’s
sounding will initially produce a patterned disturbance in the dense and elastic
medium adjacent to the source. At a later moment, the patterned disturbance will
be instantiated by a different part of the dense and elastic medium, further away
from the source along a rectilinear path. On this model, the patterned disturbance
is not travelling, at least not literally. It is not the case that the patterned distur-
bance is now located here and now there, at least not directly (De Anima 1 3 406
a 3–8). Rather, differently located parts of the dense and elastic medium come to
successively instantiate the patterned disturbance. A change of state and travel
are distinct (De Sensu 6 446 b 28). Of course the dynamic in-formation is materially
realized by the motions of bodies, but as Prichard observes, the only bodies in mo-
tion are “the oscillation of certain particles”, the force with which the patterned
disturbance propagates being communicated from one part of the medium to the
next. The propagation of the patterned disturbance in the event of rarefaction
shall be understood as a dynamic in-formation, not a kind of locomotion so much
as a kind of alteration.
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The second model is at work in Bacon’s doctrine of the multiplication of the
species (De multiplicatione specierum). A body will cause a species, an image or like-
ness of it, to inhere, in some sense, in the medium adjacent to it. Moreover, species
successively inhere in parts of the medium, each time causing the species to inhere
in an adjacent part. This has the consequence that species are continuously gen-
erated along rectilinear paths that proceed in all directions, if unobstructed, from
every point on the surface of a body. The propagation of the species does not
involve locomotion, but the generation of the species multiplied in the medium.
Species are not bodies and so are not subject to locomotion, understood as a change
to a body’s location over time. So species do not ﬂy through the air as Descartes
(La dioptrique AT VI 85) and Hobbes (Leviathan 1 1 1) complained. The propagation
of the species is, rather, the successive inherence of a form in different parts of
the medium along rectilinear paths. And that is precisely how I am proposing to
understand sonic propagation, as a kind of dynamic in-formation, speciﬁcally, as
the successive inherence of a wave-form in different parts of the medium along
rectilinear paths in every direction away from the source.
5 Motive and Objections
Why identify sounds with events of rarefaction? What recommends The Wave
Theory of Sound? The Wave Theory, or historical variants of it, have traditionally
been motivated on phenomenological grounds. Broad nicely captures the emana-
tive phenomenology of auditory experience that motivates The Wave Theory of
Sound, in contrasting auditory experience of sound with visual experience of color:
But the noise is not literally heard as the occurrence of a certain sound-
quality within a limited region remote from the percipient’s body. It
certainly is not heard as having any shape or size. It seems to be heard as
coming to one from a certain direction, and it seems to be thought of as
pervading with various degrees of intensity the whole of an indeﬁnitely
large region surrounding the centre from which it emanates. (Broad,
1952, 5)
Colors are seen to inhere in surfaces of bodies located at a distance from the per-
ceiver’s body. Colors only ever inhere in spatially extended things and inherit the
shapes and sizes of the extend things in which they inhere. But that is not how
audition presents the sounds that we hear. Sounds are not experienced as qual-
ties conﬁned to a region remote from the perceiver. Nor are sounds experienced
as qualities whose instances have the shape and size inherited from the extended
things in which they inhere. Rather. sounds are heard to come from their sources.
This is the ﬁrst aspect of the emanative phenomenology of auditory experience,
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the directionality of audition. The directionality of audition is dynamic. It is the
direction in which the patterned disturbance propagates along a rectilinear path
from its source. In addition to the directionality of audition, Broad emphasizes
the heard pervasiveness of sound: “it seems to be … pervading with various degrees
of intensity the whole of an indeﬁnitely large region surrounding the centre from
which it emanates”. The heard pervasiveness of sound, suggests that not only is
sound directional, but that it is multidirectional as well—that the patterned distur-
bance propagates in every direction, along rectilinear paths, away from the source.
Moreover, the force with which the patterned disturbance propagates weakens as
it diffuses through the medium as is evidenced by its being experienced as “per-
vading with various degrees of intensity” the whole of an indeﬁnitely large region.
The heard pervasiveness of sound is the hearer’s auditory sense that they are pre-
sented with, at least from their partial perspective, an event of rarefaction. If the
directionality of audition and the heard pervasiveness of sound have proved con-
tentious, this is only because they have been misinterpreted.
The emanative phenomenology of audition, then, comprises, at least, the direc-
tionality of audition and the heard pervasiveness of sound. The emanative phe-
nomenology of audition, so understood, naturally motivates The Wave Theory of
Sound. For suppose that auditory experience does, in fact, have an emanative phe-
nomenology, and that this aspect of our auditory experience is veridical, then in
hearing sounds emanating from their sources would just be to hear an event of rar-
efaction. The direction from which the sound is coming is just the direction of the
force with which the patterned disturbance propagates as it diffuses through the
dense and elastic medium. Broad (1952) himself does not accept The Wave The-
ory of Sound because he does not accept that the emanative phenomenology of
auditory experience is veridical. The stark phenomenological differences between
vision, audition, and touch that he observes are, by Broad’s lights, all undermined
by the common causal mechanisms that underly the operation of the senses, and
these phenomenological differences are at least misleading if not indeed illusory.
At the very least, Broad’s reﬂections establish that the emanative phenomenology
of audition only motivates The Wave Theory of Sound if it is in fact veridical.
I shall consider two kinds of objections to The Wave Theory. One seeks to
undermine the phenomenological motivation of The Wave Theory, the other seeks
to draw our attention to aspects of the phenomenology of auditory experience that
are allegedly inconsistent with The Wave Theory.
Here is O’Callaghan pressing the ﬁst kind of objection:
It might be that sounds are heard to come from a particular place by
being heard ﬁrst to be at that place, and then to be at successively closer
intermediate locations. But this is not the case with ordinary hearing.
Sounds are not heard to travel through the air as scientists have taught
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us that waves do. (O’Callaghan, 2007, 34)
Notice that O’Callaghan understands the motion in a medium allegedly disclosed
in auditory experience as a species of locomotion, as change of place over time.
But the propagation of a patterned disturbance is better understood as a dynamic
in-formation. Not the wave-form changing its location over time so much as dif-
ferently located things, different parts of the medium, successively instantiating
the wave-form. O’Callaghan is right that our auditory experience does not present
sounds changing their place over time, like a sonic bullet. But that is to misdescribe
the emanative phenomenology of audition. In hearing the sound coming from its
source, the perceiver hears the direction with which the pattern disturbance prop-
agates, understood as a dynamic in-formation, not a kind of locomotion so much
as a kind of alteration.
If O’Callaghan’s objection focuses on the ﬁrst aspect of the emanative phe-
nomenology of audition, the directionality of audition—that sounds are heard to
come from their sources, Pasnau’s objection is focuses on the second aspect of the
emanative phenomenology of audition, the heard pervasiveness of sound—that
sounds are heard to pervade a volume. According to Pasnau, sounds are not heard
to audibly ﬁll a medium except in exceptional cases. Pasnau’s objection turns on a
misinterpretation of the heard pervasiveness of sound.
Pasnau claims that most sounds do not audibly ﬁll the medium. So ﬁlling the
medium must be something audibly accessible. Consider a brief sound, such as
a call of one of London’s feral parakeets. According to The Wave Theory, the
sound is the propagation, in every direction, along rectilinear paths, of a patterned
disturbance, through a dense and elastic medium. In one clear sense, the only
audible aspect of this complex event is the patterned disturbance as it is through
some interval of time. The outer boundary of the sphere, the narrow band which
is the patterned disturbance, is audible in the sense of being a potential proximal
cause of the auditory experience of the sound. So while the complex event may be
envisioned as a growing sphere, since the sound is brief, the only audible aspect of
the sound is at the moving boundary of the sphere, the narrow band which is the
patterned disturbance. After all, if a perceiver is placed within the sphere between
the source of the sound and the narrow band at the sphere’s outer boundary, they
are no longer in a position to hear the sound.
In one clear sense that may be so, but there are other, relevant senses of audi-
bility. So, if circumstances are propitious, we can hear the direction of the sound’s
propagation. We may even have a sense of how far off the source is. So aspects
of the complex sound event are in another relevant sense audible and in that they
are not merely conﬁned to the patterned disturbance at the outer boundary of the
sphere. Nor are these exceptional cases.
The Wave Theory is only committed to sounds being heard to ﬁll the air in this
13
latter sense. In this sense, something is audible if it is heard in hearing a sound. Of
course, even on the ﬁrst sense of audible, understood as a potential proximal cause
of the perception of the sound, a continuous sound, such as a sound of a water-
fall, will audibly ﬁll the air—the continuously produced patterned disturbances will
pervade the space between the perceiver and its source. But as Pasnau observes,
and The Wave Theory predicts, these are exceptional cases.
Pasnau not only presses the ﬁrst kind of objection but also the second kind.
That is, he objects not only to The Wave Theory’s phenomenological motivation,
but maintains as well that there are aspects of the phenomenology of auditory
experience that are inconsistent with it:
We do not hear sounds as being in the air; we hear them as being at the
place where they are generated. Listening to the birds outside your win-
dow, the students outside your door, the cars going down your street,
in the vast majority of cases you will perceive those sounds as being
located at the place where they originate. At least, you will hear those
sounds as being located somewhere in the distance, in a certain general
direction. But if sounds are in the air, as the standard view holds, then
the cries of birds and of students are all around you. This is not how it
seems (except perhaps in special cases ...).
Pasnau’s argument has two parts:
(1) A claim about where sounds are when we hear them if The Wave Theory is
true.
(2) A claim that our auditory experience includes a distal element.
For now bracket the ﬁst claim, and consider only the second (we shall subsequently
return to the issue of where the sounds would be if The Wave Theory were true).
When one listens to the birds outside one’s window, the students outside one’s
door, and the cars going down one’s street, what is it that one is listening to? A
ﬂat-footed answer would be, well, birds, students, and cars, or at least their audible
activities. But birds, students, and cars, or at least their activities, while audible,
are not themselves sounds but their sources, at least potentially. If we hear not only
sounds, but their sources, then discovering a distal element in auditory experience
is not sufficient to establish that the sounds that we hear are themselves distal.
After all the distal element may be the presentation in auditory experience of not
the sound but its source.
Another objection of the second kind that conﬂates sounds with their sources
is O’Callgahan’s (2007, 89) argument from timbre. O’Callaghan argues that au-
ditory constancies concerning timbre favor thinking of the sounds that we hear
as the causing of the propagation of a patterned disturbance, as opposed to the
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propagation of the patterned disturbance, as The Wave Theory contends. After
all, timbre, or a natural subcomponent of it, carries information about the mate-
rial structure of bodies relevant to their participation in an event that causes the
patterned disturbance to propagate, in every direction, along rectilinear paths, in
a dense and elastic medium. If timbre were an audible quality of sound, then this
would favor thinking of sound as the causing of the propagation of a patterned
disturbance. Timbre is an audible quality, to be sure, but is it best thought of as an
audible quality of sound? The conclusion that O’Callaghan draws from Handel’s
(1995) research—that timbre depends, at least in part, upon features of the source
and the characteristic manner in which it disturbs the medium—suggests, instead,
that timbre, or at least some natural subcomponent of it, is better understood as
an audible quality of the sound’s source, the sound-generating event.
If it is controversial what sounds are, how plausible is it to rely, as I have been
doing, on the the distinction between sounds and their sources? After all, if sounds
are up for grabs, isn’t the distinction between sounds and their sources up for grabs
as well? What ought not to be controversial is that there are sound-generating
events. While it may be controversial whether sound-generating events are audi-
ble, some latter-day Berkeleans such as A.D. Smith (2002) deny it, it should be un-
controversial that such events exist. Which events they are will depend, of course,
upon what sounds are since these events are the causes of sound, but it should be
uncontroversial that there are such sources. But even allowing that the identiﬁ-
cation of an event as the cause of sound will depend upon the controversial issue
of what sounds are, there are still things that we can conclude about sources, for
example, that they can be at a distance from the perceiver, and that they have au-
dible qualities if heard. Moreover, these conclusions about sources, if warranted,
together with the claim that sources are audible, might legitimately ground the
lines of criticism presently pursued.
Where is the event of rarefaction? Its location is an occasion-sensitive matter
(in Travis’ 2008 sense). On some occasions, in some practical circumstances, the
location of the event of rarefaction is perceiver-dependent. Sounds are located
where they hear them (Nudds 2009, O’Shaughnessy 2009). If sounds are events
of rarefaction, then sounds, on such occasions, would count as located at the in-
tersection between the outer band at the boundary of the expanding sphere and
the perceiver. On other occasions, in other practical circumstances, a perceiver-
independent location of sound is required. Perhaps no perceiver is relevant, or
perhaps no one heard the sound. In such circumstances where should the sound be
located? We cannot locate sounds in the region encompassed by their boundaries
as they lack stable and determinate boundaries, and given the neat symmetry of
the event, the patterned disturbance propagating in very direction from its source,
it is natural to locate them at their center, at or near their source (see Sorenson’s
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2009 analogy with earthquakes, another kind of event of rarefaction).
If the location of sound, conceived as an event of rarefaction, is an occasion-
sensitive matter, then considered in abstraction from any practical reason for say-
ing so, sounds lack determinate locations. If The Wave Theory of sound is a co-
herent credible alternative in the metaphysics of sound, we should reject any tax-
onomy of sound based on its determinate location. Thus Casati and Dokic (2014)
taxonomizes non-aspatial views of sound as distal, medial, or proximal, depend-
ing upon their determinate location. According to The Wave Theory, sounds are
events with location and so are not aspatial. Nor are they distal, medial, or prox-
imal, since their location is not determinately distal, medial, or proximal. The
taxonomy should be rejected since it unreasonably excludes a live possibility.
6 The Event of Rarefaction
Allow me, in this section, to make a summary statement of the position at which
we have arrived.
According to The Wave Theory, as developed herein, the propagation of a pat-
terned disturbance, in every direction, along rectilinear paths, through a dense and
elastic medium is the progressive instantiation of a wave-form, a kind of dynamic
in-formation, realized by the motion of the local parts of the medium, the oscil-
lation of certain particles. Though the sound event may be said to have location,
sonic propagation is not best modelled on the locomotion of a body, like a sonic
missile. As O’Callaghan observes, that is not how auditory experience presents
sound as coming from its source. It is rather better understood as a kind of dynamic
in-formation. Sounds are heard to come from their sources in the sense that a rec-
tilinear direction of the propagation of the patterned disturbance in the growth of
the sound event is disclosed in auditory experience. On that model, there are cer-
tain natural alternative understandings of the location of a sound event. Locating
the sound event in the space encompassed by stable and determinate boundaries is
not possible since they lack these. On certain occasions, for certain practical pur-
poses, sounds may be said to be where we hear them. On other occasions, for other
purposes, sounds may be said to be located at their center, at or near their sources.
And each alternative is consistent with the sound event being the propagation,
in every direction, along rectilinear paths, of a patterned disturbance, through a
dense and imperfectly elastic medium understood as the progressive instantiation
of a wave-form realized by the motion of the local parts of the medium.
As a dynamic in-formation, the sound event has a kind of unity irreducible to the
motion of the local parts of the in-formed medium. Conceiving of the propagation
of sound on the model of the locomotion of a body—a sonic missile—mistakes
the unity of the sound event for the unity of a body. Sound events may lack the
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unity of a body. After all, events and bodies have different modes of being. But
sound events nevertheless possess sufficient unity to distinguish them from the
in-formed medium that they existentially depend upon. It is a dynamic unity (on
dynamic principles of unity see Johnston 2006). It is the force with which the
patterned disturbance propagates, in every direction, along rectilinear paths, that
explains the growth of the sound event. While the sound event may be realized
by the motion of the local parts of the medium, the oscillation of certain particles,
it is the force of its propagation, communicated from one part to the next, that
determines the dynamic in-formation. The sound event is realized by the motion
of the local parts of the medium without reducing to such motion because of its
dynamic unity, the force with which it grows in the dense and imperfectly elastic
medium. And it is the direction of this force that is disclosed, more or less clearly,
in the emanative phenomenology of auditory experience.
7 Hearing Sources in the Sounds They Generate
We hear sounds. If circumstances are propitious, we can hear as well their sources
(or so we have been assuming). At least two questions arise. Assuming that audi-
tion has a function, is the function of audition to afford the perceiver with auditory
awareness of sounds or their sources? And what is the relationship, in audition,
between the sounds that we hear and the sources that we hear when we do hear
them?
Consider ﬁrst the function of auditory awareness. Proximal perturbations in the
dense and elastic medium, be it air, water, or some other suitable material, are rela-
tively uninteresting features of the natural environment, at least from a biological
point of view. The distal causes of these proximal perturbations, however, may
be of vital concern, be they the approach of predator or prey. Given the selective
advantage afforded by hearing the distal sources of the proximal perturbations im-
pinging upon the perceiver, it is natural to think that the function of audition is to
afford auditory awareness of the sources of sounds. This is an empirical bet. But it
is an empirical bet shared by other philosophers and psychologists (Nudds 2009,
Bregman 1990)
What is the relationship, in audition, between the sounds that we hear and the
sources that we hear when we do hear them? We shall consider two models. The
ﬁrst is more familiar, but if we assume the truth of The Wave Theory of Sound,
the second is more likely to be true.
On the ﬁrst model, we hear sources by hearing the sounds that they generate.
Sounds are audible. Moreover, sounds are audible in themselves. Sounds are audi-
ble in themselves in that they contain within themselves the power of their own
audibility. Sound, so understood, is the immediate object of explicit awareness
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afforded by auditory experience. And we mediately hear a source by immediately
hearing the sound that it generates. We only come to be aware of the source by
ﬁrst being aware of the sound that it generates. Sources, on this model, are au-
dible, but not audible in themselves, but audible only in virtue of sounds that are
audible in themselves. Structurally at least, the ﬁrst model, then, is a kind of sonic
indirect realism.
The ﬁrst model is, in an important respect, incomplete. For how do sounds me-
diately present their sources when they do? What is the audible relation between
the sound and its source that would explain how the presentation, in audition, of
a sound, can, at the same time, be the mediate presentation of its source? Causal
relations, the relation of inherence that a quality bears to its substratum, and the
part–whole relation have been discussed by Leddington (2014) and O’Callaghan
(2011). However, as we shall see, no matter how it is best completed, the ﬁrst
model misdescribes the structure of auditory experience.
On the second model, we do not hear sources by hearing the sounds that they
generate. Rather we hear the source of the sound, when we do, through or in the
sound that it generates (Leddington 2014, Kalderon 2018, chapter 4). When we
hear a source, the source is immanent in the sound it is heard to generate. On
the second model, sources need not be mediate objects of audition. We may be
explicitly aware of the source of a sound without ﬁrst being explicitly aware of its
sound. The second model, then rejects the indirect sonic realism of the ﬁrst.
The ﬁrst model faces phenomenological and empirical problems.
Sonic indirect realism does not seem an apt description of our auditory experi-
ence. In “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger presents an opposing view:
We never really ﬁrst perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and
noises, in the appearance of things … ; rather we hear the storm whistling
in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mer-
cedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to
us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut
in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds.
(Heidegger, 1935/2000)
Nothing hangs on Heidegger’s apparent acceptance of the empiricist identiﬁca-
tion of sound with acoustical sensation. What is important is Heidegger’s denial
of the claim that we hear the source of a sound by attending to that sound. Rather,
we hear the source without attending to its sound. When we attend to our audi-
tory experience, as Heidegger invites us to, we attend to the sources of sounds
and rarely, if at all, to the sounds in distinction from their sources. In hearing
the storm whistling in the chimney, the three-motored plane, the Mercedes in im-
mediate distinction from the Volkswagen, there is no explicit experience of their
sound distinct from hearing these sources. That is consistent with maintaining
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that hearing a source necessarily involves acoustical sensation. We may be implic-
itly aware of the sound in explicitly attending to its source. And yet Heidegger is
clearly denying the claim that he hear the source of a sound by hearing the sound.
There is one explicit experience, hearing the storm whistling in the chimney, and
no distinct explicit experience of its sound, even if hearing the source involves im-
plicit awareness of its sound. If Heidegger is right about the phenomenology, we
should reject the ﬁrst model of the relationship between heard sounds and their
sources. (For discussion see Leddington 2014 and Kalderon 2018, chapter 3)
Nudds (2009), drawing on the work of Bregman (1990, chapter 4), raises an
empirical issue affecting the ﬁrst model. In circumstances with multiple active
sources of sounds, the auditory system faces a familiar underdetermination prob-
lem. The proximal stimuli consist in frequency components, and the auditory
system must group these frequency components into the separable sounds that
are heard. However, no particular grouping of frequency components is uniquely
determined by the proximal stimuli. How does the auditory system address this
undertermination problem? It does so, in part, by making a number of substantive
assumptions about the likely source of these frequency components. That is to
say, that the auditory system segments a sound from all that is heard by identify-
ing its likely source. At least in the special circumstances where there are multiple
active sources of sound, the sounds that we hear are not heard independently of
hearing their source. But if that is right, then sounds are not audible in them-
selves, at least not in every circumstance. They do not contain within themselves
the power of their own audibility, at least not wholly, in every circumstance. If
anything, something like the reverse is true in the given circumstances. In circum-
stances with multiple active sources of sound, sounds are audible, but not audible
in themsleves, but audible only insofar as one hears the sources that generate them.
(If the sources remain elusive to the auditory system, one wouldn’t hear the several
sounds but only an indiscriminate noise.)
Sounds need not be audible in themselves. Rather, in some cases at least, they
are more like audible media. What does it mean to describe sounds as perceptual
media? Perceptual media need not be thought of as physical media, the movement
of whose local parts, “the oscillation of certain particles,” realize the progressive in-
stantiation of a wave form. While the idea of physical media merely answers to the
demands of being a causal intermediary, the idea of perceptual media answers to
the demands of perceptual accessibility. Light does not require physical media in
which to propagate in the way that sound waves do. As the Michelson–Morley ex-
periment of 1887 went some way toward showing, there is no Luminiferous aether.
But the illuminated air may be a perceptual medium, nonetheless. So consider
the following. Just as illumination makes the visible perceptually accessible, sound
makes the activities of distal bodies perceptually accessible. Without illumina-
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tion, the colors of distal bodies remain unseen, without sound, the activities of
distal bodies remain unheard. One sees through, or in, illuminated media, such as
air or water, and thereby perceives the colors of distal bodies arrayed in the natu-
ral environment. One hears through, or in, audible media, the sound, and thereby
perceives the activities of distal bodies arrayed in the natural environment.
Perceptual media like sound and the illuminant, are perceptible. Moreover, not
only are perceptual media themselves perceptible, but they are perceptible in a
certain way. Speciﬁcally, they are not perceptible in themselves, but owe their
perceptibility to other things which are perceptible in themselves, the objects the
perceptual media make perceptually accessible. One sees the character of the il-
lumination by seeing the way objects are illuminated. When viewing a brightly
lit pantry, one sees the brightness of the pantry by seeing the brightly lit objects
arranged in it. So the illuminant is visible, though not visible in itself, but owes
its visibility to the objects that it illuminates. (For a comparison with Aristotle’s
deﬁnition of transparency, De anima 2 7 418 b 4–6, see Kalderon 2015, 41–42; for a
contemporary defence of this claim see Hilbert 2005.) Like the illuminant, sound is
perceptible, though perceptible in a certain way. In cases where one hears a sound
and its source, one hears the character of a sound by hearing the activities of its
distal source. (Think of how difficult it is to describe ecological sound without
describing audible aspects of its source.) In such cases, sound is audible, though
not audible in itself, but owes its audibility to the distal source that it discloses.
The disclosure of the distal source of sound in auditory experience may require
the activity of an attentive listener. I turn, and listen, and hear the call of the
feral parakeet. What I hear is the audible activity of a distal body, the animate
body of the feral bird. Audition affords me explicit awareness of the parakeet’s
call. I hear how loud it is, its distinctive timbre, and its sharpness and urgency.
I hear the parakeet’s call through, or in, the sound that it makes. The parakeet’s
calling generates a patterned disturbance that propagates, in every direction, along
rectilinear paths, through the dense and imperfectly elastic air. It is through, or
in, this audible media, the sound that it makes, that the call of the feral parakeet is
heard. In turning, and listening, and hearing, I alter my auditory perspective on the
natural environment to bring an aspect of that environment, the audible activity
of the feral parakeet, into earshot. Turning, and listening, and hearing—actively
changing my auditory perspective on the natural environment—is a sympathetic
response to what is heard. Changing my auditory perspective to increase the acuity
with which the feral parakeet is heard is to sympathetically respond to the call of
the feral parakeet. Preparedness to act in certain ways so that the impingement of
the force of the propagation of the patterned disturbance, the dynamic principle
of unity of the sound event, carries information about its distal source, sensitivity
to which constitutes, in propitious circumstances, explicit auditory awareness of
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that source, is what makes possible the presentation, in auditory experience, of
the source of the sound.
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